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Silence, intellect and discourse in the Quest for the 
True Teaching – Reflections on hermes Trismegistos’ 
‘definitions’22
igor dorfmann-Lazarev
in his article, Graham Ward offers us a reflection on verses 1:21–25 of the Epistle 
of James, in which, as he observes, the Logos (the ‘Word’ or a ‘discourse’) ought 
first to be received – to the point of becoming ‘im-planted’ (emphytos) – and then 
‘enacted’. here the Epistle’s author observes fundamental Biblical logic, according 
to which the word uttered by a prophet is always preceded by the word received by 
him from God. in the most striking way, perhaps, the link between the letting in 
of the word and its public expression is found in the vision of Ezekiel 2:8–3:3 in 
which the ‘son of man’ is told first ‘to eat a roll of a book’ – to the point of ‘filling 
with it his bowels’ – and then ‘to speak unto the house of israel’. This episode also 
inspired the author of the book that closes the Christian Canon (cf. Rev 10:9–11).
in the Epistle of James, however, it is not the prophecy, or more generally the 
speech, that is in question but ‘working the righteousness of God’ (1:20). Ward 
suggests reading James’ binomial ‘hearers (akroatai) of the Word/doers (poiêtai) 
of the Word’ in the perspective of the Alexandrian exegetical theory of divinization. 
this provides him with a new key for the interpretation of this book which, 
ever since Luther, who had found it contradictory in every respect to Paul, has 
presented a particular challenge to Protestant Biblical commentators. Man, situated 
between the Word Creator and the created word, occupies according to Ward an 
intermediate position in the process of theopoiesis in which the ‘word’ appears 
contemporaneously as both the subject and the object of creative action. Ward 
thence comes to a consideration of human activity in the world, thus contributing 
to the discussion of the ontological value of man’s acts, the underlying exegetical 
problem regarding both James and Paul.23 his emphasis on the aesthetical aspects 
of human activity and human experiences drives him away, however, from the 
central concerns of the Epistle’s author.
22 The author expresses his gratitude to Christoph Schneider for his invitation to take 
part in this exchange and to the Rev. Peter F. Johnson, Charles Lock and John Lindsay Opie 
for helping the author improve his English style.
23 Cf. hubert Frankemölle, Der Brief des Jakobus (2 vols, Gütersloh 1994), vol. 1, 
pp. 339–40, in which the author discusses the Rezeptionsgeschichte of the Epistle of James 
in twentieth-century Germany, stressing the role of this text in the activity of the Resistance 
under the Nazi regime.
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Kenosis, Poiesis and Genesis 177
Reflecting on James’ language, Ward mentions a brief observation made 
more than half a century ago by W.L. Knox on the similarity between the ‘types 
of speculation’ proper to the Epistle of James and to the writings attributed 
to hermes Trismegistos (hermes ‘the Thrice-Greatest’).24 a closer glance at 
hermes will allow us to place James and his vision of man’s activity in the wider 
perspective of coeval religious thought. The hermetic corpus reaches back to the 
ancient Egyptian wisdom texts, but in its extant form reflects the cosmopolitan 
intellectual ambience of Roman Egypt25 and in some parts notably carries traces 
of the Bible and Apocrypha, as well as of Alexandrian Jewish exegetical thought. 
The texts attributed to Trismegistos were therefore shaped in the same area in 
which, towards the end of the second century, the Alexandrian Christian theology 
was born.
As in Christianity, the relationship between God and man is at the core of 
the hermetic tradition. The various texts of hermetic literature reveal different 
perspectives on this matter however, and although they could have been studied 
and meditated upon in the same circles of adherents, each of them ought to be 
treated in its own right. We suggest here bringing James’ anthropology, which 
Ward’s article discusses, into juxtaposition with one of the older of the hermetic 
philosophical works, which has only recently become accessible to western 
readers and has not yet received sufficient attention from New Testament scholars. 
We refer to the ‘definitions’ attributed to hermes, which are preserved in their 
fullest form in Armenian.26 Jean-Pierre Mahé, the author of the critical edition of 
the Armenian text, dates the original Greek to the period from the first century BC 
to the first century Ad, suggesting that its sources may go back much further.27 
The ‘definitions’ or their direct sources, therefore, might have been known to the 
author of the Epistle of James.
The ‘definitions’, addressed by hermes ‘the Thrice-Great’ (Eŕamec, in 
Armenian ← Trismegas) to his disciple Asclepius, were translated into Armenian 
in the second half of the sixth century. They belonged to the numerous Greek 
24 Wilfred L. Knox, ‘The Epistle of St. James’, The Journal of Theological Studies, 
OS–XLVi, 181–2 (1945): 14–16.
25 The latest hermetic texts were put into writing before the end of the third century 
Ad; see A.d. Nock, in Corpus Hermeticum. Asclepius, ed. A.d. Nock, trans. A.-J. Festugière 
(4 vols, Paris, 1945) vol. 2, pp. 259, 275.
26 the editio princeps of the ‘definitions’ was published in 1956 by h. Manandian. 26 
years later, J.-P. Mahé prepared a new critical edition, translation and detailed commentary; 
cf. Jean-Pierre Mahé, Hermès en Haute Egypte: les textes hermétiques de Nag Hammadi 
et leurs parallèles grecs et latins. Le fragment du Discours parfait et les Définitions 
hermétiques arméniennes (2 vols, Québec 1978–82), vol. 2, pp. 358–405. Later, an edition 
of the surviving Greek fragments of the ‘definitions’ datable by the eleventh century was 
prepared jointly by J. Paramelle and J.-P. Mahé, ‘Nouveaux parallèles grecs aux définitions 
hermétiques arméniennes’, REArm, XXii (1990–91): 115–34.
27 Mahé, Hermès en Haute Egypte, vol. 2, p. 278. 
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Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy178
texts from which the armenian divines, followers of the alexandrian exegetical 
and doctrinal traditions, sought to obtain the dialectical instruments for defining 
Christological orthodoxy independently of the imperial Church.28 the interest 
in hermes could have been provoked in particular by the positive appreciation 
given him by Gregory of Nazianzos, one of the most quoted Greek fathers in 
Armenia, and by Cyril of Alexandria, the major authority for the Christology 
of the Armenian Church.29 to evoke this text in connection with the present 
encounter between the orthodoxy shaped by the first half of the ninth century 
in the west of Asia Minor and a new, ‘Radical’, orthodoxy elaborated today at 
Cambridge has a particular significance: it offers us the opportunity to recall still 
another orthodoxy, that which had been sought by Armenians, Syrians, Egyptians 
and Ethiopians during several centuries following the rejection of the ‘definition’ 
of the council of Chalcedon (451) across the area extending from Transcaucasia 
in the north to the horn of Africa in the south.
The hermetic ‘definitions’ therefore link the Nile valley with the mountains of 
the Caucasus, that ancient frontier between Asia and Europe, thus bequeathing to 
Christendom the wisdom of ancient Egypt. The survival of this text in numerous 
Armenian manuscripts,30 in spite of the adversities of armenian history, as well 
as the wide use of the ‘definitions’ made by mediaeval Armenian authors,31 
demonstrates its importance for the articulation of Armenian orthodoxy in the 
period following the first great schism of the Christian Church.
in what follows, we shall outline several salient points of hermes’ vision of 
human activity and human discourse in the light of the relationship between man 
and God. The author of the ‘definitions’ distinguishes five gifts with which, in 
their various combinations, the different kinds of living beings are endowed: life, 
28 After more than a century of debates and confrontations in the Near East resulting 
from the teaching of Eutyches and the ensuing council of Chalcedon, the Armenian Church 
rejected both the extreme monophysitism and the imperial doctrine at the council of 
duin in 553–5. in the following centuries, Armenian divines elaborated an autonomous 
Christological theory along the lines of Cyril of Alexandria. The integral humanity of 
Christ was expressed by them in various ways, but the designation of Christ’s divinity 
and humanity as two comparable entities belonging to one and the same abstract category 
of nature was avoided. On the schism provoked by the council of Chalcedon and on the 
formation of the autonomous Churches in the Near East, see the contributions of P. Maraval, 
N. Garsoïan and J.-P. Mahé in Histoire du Christianisme, ed. J.-M. Mayeur et al. (14 vols, 
Paris 1990–2001), vol. 3, pp. 457–81, 1125–67; ibid., vol. 4, pp. 457–548.
29 Claudio Moreschini, Storia dell’ermetismo cristiano (Brescia, 2000), pp. 94–101.
30 The most important manuscript of the ‘definitions’ is a florilegium composed in 
1282 by the learned Məxit‘ar of Ayrivank‘ († c.1290), prior of the Monastery of the Cavern 
which had been carved between the middle of the twelfth century and the second half of 
the thirteenth within the rock in the gorge of the river Azat in North-Eastern Armenia; see 
Mahé, Hermès en Haute Egypte, vol. 2, pp. 320–27.
31 Cf. Mahé, Hermès en Haute Égypte, vol. 2, pp. 333–54; M. Van Esbroeck, ‘J.-P. 
Mahé, Hermès en Haute-Égypte’, REArm, XVii (1983): 692–3.
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
 w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.c
om
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
Kenosis, Poiesis and Genesis 179
breath, soul, intellect and discourse. Man is the only being endowed with both 
intellect32 and discourse.33 The intellect is the highest gift, which is superior to 
the natural world, the world of physical bodies, and is capable of supernatural 
and unlimited sight and thought (‘definitions’ iV.2; V.1–3; X.5). it enables man 
to accomplish himself: ‘The perfection of the soul is the knowledge of beings’ 
(Vi.3); ‘Man’s plenitude is the knowledge of God’ (Vii.5); ‘Each man, insofar as 
he conceives of God, is a man’ (iX.1). Man, for hermes, is therefore a dynamic 
being who is realized in continuous becoming34 and is ordained to the knowledge 
of the world and of God through the exercise of his intellect.
The intellect acquires knowledge35 and understanding36 in silence and expresses 
them in ‘intelligent’, or ‘meditative’,37 ‘discourse’ which, according to hermes, 
is its ‘servant’ interpreting the intellect’s designs. Only the intellect is able to 
conceive38 and to comprehend ‘discourse’ (V.1–3). Such discourse, proceeding 
from the intellect as its direct function inherits its qualities: since the intellect is 
infinite in its cognitive capacity, discourse is infinite in its capacity for articulating 
the wisdom acquired by the former. Therefore, meditative discourse, which through 
the intermediary of the intellect ascends to silence, becomes the image of silence; 
it links human existence to infinity and brings salvation to men: ‘Man has become 
mortal because of his body, but because of discourse [he] is immortal’ (V.2).
Meditative discourse is, similarly to James 1:21–2, at once man’s creation and 
God’s salvific gift. it is distinguished from the ‘discourse of the crowd’ (V.3; X.7) 
which necessarily proceeds from some other discourse – the crowd being deprived 
of intellect – and therefore does not establish any bond with the higher level of 
reality, i.e. does not represent a channel of the transcendent. the latter kind of 
discourse, which is merely ‘man’s invention’, generates a vicious circle between 
32 ‘intellect’: mitk‛ in the armenian version. it corresponds to noàj in the surviving 
Greek fragments and evokes the ‘heart’ of the ancient Egyptian wisdom texts; see Mahé, 
Hermès en Haute Egypte, vol. 2, p. 297.
33 ‘discourse’: ban in the armenian version, which corresponds to lÒgoj in the 
surviving Greek fragment.
34 Similarly in the Epistle of James; cf. Frankemölle, Der Brief des Jakobus, vol. 1, 
p. 341; with respect to James 1.25d, h. Frankemölle underlines: ‘der Mensch sein Glück 
nicht (instrumental) “durch sein Tun” erlangt, sondern (modal, durativ) “in seinem Tun” 
und “während des Tuns”’ (ibid.).
35 ‘to know’: gitem ← oda; ‘knowledge’: gitut‘iwn ← gnîsij.
36 ‘to understand’: imanam ← nošw.
37 ‘discourse’ is once called mtawor (V.3), ‘intelligent’ (a term elsewhere also 
qualifying the ‘soul’), and once par-imac‘akan (X.7), ‘meditative’. The latter term appears 
only once in the text. The Greek fragment does not contain the parallel verses, but we may 
presume that the second term could be the calque of perinohmatikÒj. These terms should 
be distinguished from ‘intelligible’ (qualifying ‘world’, ‘things’, ‘good’ and ‘substance’), 
imanali ← nohtÒj.
38 ‘conceive’: yłanam, the same lexeme which describes the germination of embryos.
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
 w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.c
om
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
   
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy180
the bodies of this world and thus brings forth perdition (V.2–3).39 similarly to 
hermes, James – as Ward notices – distinguishes between true and false wisdom, 
between the wisdom which ‘descends from above’ and brings good fruits and that 
which is ‘earthly, animal and demoniac’ (Jas 3:14–18).
in spite of the place reserved by hermes for silence in the cognitive process 
and of his condemnation of the ‘discourses of the crowd’, the author does not 
confine his hearers to interior and abstract meditation. Although he contemplates 
beauty and harmony (ii.1; iX.4; X.1,7), he is also concerned with the concrete 
setting of human life in the world and with man’s responsibility with regard to 
everything his senses perceive. in hermes’s view, man is endowed with free will; 
he creates salvific discourse and is divinized through his active acquaintance and 
his engagement with the world: ‘Will, comprehend, believe, love!’ (Viii.7). Work 
is connatural to men, so that ‘men working the earth’ are likened by him to ‘the 
stars adorning heaven’ (iX.7).
The world exists for the sake of man, just as man for the sake of God, and man 
is a ‘free living being’ in the world, the only being which has ‘dominion over good 
and bad’ (Vi.1; Viii.6; iX.1). Man’s senses, by which he perceives and apprehends 
the world, testify that man and the world are ordained to each other as the lord 
to his dominion: ‘if there were no seer [of the world], there would certainly be 
neither he himself, nor that what is seen [by him]’ (Vi.1). Man therefore exercises 
his dominion over the world also through being its observer and interpreter. he 
thus occupies the key position in the universe wherein he plays the role of mediator 
between God and the natural world entrusted to him.
Man’s attentive reflection on the world has liberating effect: ‘if nothing seems 
to you an insignificant fact, you will discover both the fact and its artificer; if 
everything seems to you a joke, you will be made a joke yourself’ (Viii.5); 
the world exists in order that through it man may know God (Viii.6); God is 
intelligible, he ‘is invisible although observable in the things visible to us’ (i.2); 
‘he who knows God, does not fear God; he who does not know God, fears God. 
he who knows nothing about the beings of this [world] fears everyone [of them], 
but he who knows all about these beings, fears no one … he who reflects by the 
means of the intellect on himself, knows himself’ (iX.3–4). Through observation 
of the world, the intellect thus discovers its creator, and death is overcome 
through the understanding of the world: ‘death comprehended is immortality, 
uncomprehended is death’ (Viii.5; iX.2,4; X.6).
39 Other hermetic texts suggest that he who follows the instructions of meditative discourse is 
on the ‘way of life’; see Mahé, Hermès en Haute Egypte, vol. 2, p. 298 ; id., ‘La voie d’immortalité’, 
Vigiliae Christianae 45 (1991): 351–636. The accomplishment of God’s commandments as the 
‘upright way’ which gives life, as the image of the way from bondage to freedom and of the way 
to the promised Land, is also fundamental to several Biblical books (see above all deut 5:32–3; 
10:12–13; 11:22–8; 28:11–14; 31:29) whence it has been inherited by ecclesiastical writers for the 
definition of orthodoxy, the ‘upright teaching’, that is the ‘upright way’ which deviates neither to 
the right nor to the left which are associated with different heresies.
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Kenosis, Poiesis and Genesis 181
The natural world is ‘the mirror of truth’, the embodiment of bodiless reality, 
as meditative discourse is the image of silence. Only the intellect, however, is able 
to look into this mirror. The intellect is also called by hermes ‘light’, because it 
illuminates, by means of the discourse it creates, visible things in such a way as 
to see through them the invisible things. The relationship of discourse to silence 
is parallel to the relationship of the world to truth: in both cases, the latter is the 
image of the former. Moreover, whilst nature is ‘the light of non-manifest [things]’ 
(Viii.5), the intellect is the ‘light’ which enables the one who possesses it to see 
the ‘interior things’ (iX.2).
The parallelism between discourse and the world – as well as between 
their prototypes, truth and silence – could probably be extended further. Above 
we observed that meditative discourse is, for hermes, at once a gift and man’s 
creation. We may consequently assume that the ‘definitions’ implicitly allot a 
similar intermediate position also to the natural world. indeed, we find there the 
following symmetrical statement in which the world occupies the central position 
between God and man: ‘God is in himself; the world is in God; man is in the 
world’ (Vii.5). hermes also seems to suggest that the world at once illuminates 
man and is the object of man’s enlightened action: on the one hand, nature is called 
‘generous’ because it ‘teaches everybody’ the truth (Viii.5); on the other hand, 
‘everything [exists] for the sake of man’, and man, who exists for the sake of God, 
is called to act in the world, thus transforming it by his action and conferring on it 
a new meaning by his interpretation. Only through this twofold activity does man 
attain to salvation. this coincidentia oppositorum in the definitions of the world 
and of discourse – comparable to that observed by Ward in the Epistle of James 
– can, according to J-P. Mahé, be traced back to the procedures of the mythical 
thought of ancient Egypt.40
we may, therefore, observe a similarity between James and hermes both in their 
anthropology and in their speculative methods. however, whilst in James’ view (in 
accord with the idea dominant in the Bible and rabbinic literature) the Christian 
achieves perfection through the accomplishment of God’s commandments,41 for the 
author of the ‘definitions’ man primarily expresses himself in cognition, thereby 
attaining to salvation. nevertheless, hermes’ perspective cannot hereby be associated 
with Gnosticism. The author of the ‘definitions’ implies no split within the intellect;42 
in sharp opposition to Gnostic perception, he implies monistic cognition and 
contemplates an optimistic anthropology in which all human faculties deliberately 
operate in the world in the effort to attain the knowledge of God.43 Moreover, as we 
have seen, hermes also envisages a piety enlightened by knowledge and implying 
40 Mahé, Hermès en Haute Egypte, vol. 2, pp. 290–91.
41 Cf. Frankemölle, Der Brief des Jakobus, vol. 1, pp. 318, 337–8.
42 Cf. Andreas Löw, Hermes Trismegistos als Zeuge der Wahrheit. Die christliche 
Hermetikrezeption von Athenagoras bis Laktanz (Berlin, 2002), p. 17, note 60.
43 Mahé sees in the Trismegistus’ optimistic view of life the spiritual legacy of the 
pharaohs’ Egypt; cf. Mahé, Hermès en Haute Egypte, vol. 2, p. 454.
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Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy182
faith and love (Viii.7). indeed, in his view, man’s relation to God is not merely 
that of cognition, but also involves companionship, affinity and reciprocal longing: 
‘Where man is, [there is] also God … God is man’s friend, man is God’s friend. 
[There is] a kinship between God and man … Man is desirable for God, and God for 
man’ (iX.6); ‘What[ever] God makes, he makes for the sake of man’ (Viii.2); it is 
solely man to whom ‘God manifests himself’ and ‘to whom he listens’ and, in order 
to talk to him, changes his form and ‘becomes man’ (iX.6).44
in what direction do the ‘definitions’ orient theological thought? hermes 
suggests that man’s discourse must always proceed from a personal spiritual 
experience which implies the engagement with both silence and the world; 
otherwise discourse risks degenerating into chatter. This intuition warns the 
theologian concerning two options, the excessive institutionalization of theology 
and the overproduction of theological texts, especially in times of diminishing 
religious life. in both these cases the source of supernatural knowledge, the 
encounter with the divine occurring in silence, is interposed, in the one case 
by an impersonal structure and in the other by the infinite chains of derivative 
commentaries or by invented meanings.
the special veneration accorded the fathers by the armenian and other 
Eastern Churches does not seem to be extraneous to hermes’ intuition. in the 
consciousness of these Churches, the fathers are the spiritual athletes whose 
theology is particularly precious, not on account of the fathers’ formal ministerial 
office, but rather because of the conviction that it sprang from singular encounters 
with the divine. to refer to their heritage is therefore to maintain a living bond 
with the privileged moments of human history. This special position allotted the 
fathers has safeguarded the Eastern Churches from an excessive dilation of their 
dogmatic corpora. To return to the fathers is to return to the essential verities over 
the centuries of religious writing (and, also, of religious chatter).
The Armenians, the guardians of hermes’ ‘definitions’, like other miaphysites, 
were indeed ‘radical’ in their attachment to the founding events, figures and texts 
of their Church: even the Byzantine tradition was in their eyes excessive in its 
centuries-old development of dogma. To cite but one example: the ninth-century 
Armenian divine isaac Mŕut, a contemporary of Photius the Great, referring 
to the dogmas endorsed by the imperial Church since the council of Ephesus 
(431, the last Ecumenical council recognized by the Armenians), reproached 
44 in order to render our presentation less cumbersome, we have ignored all those 
concepts present in the ‘definitions’ which do not directly relate to our topic: we have 
not spoken of the ‘derivative’ gods, nor of the distinctions between mortal and immortal 
beings, between the sensible and the intelligible worlds, between elements, substances and 
natures constituting the world. We have also ignored the qualities of genders and of souls 
and bodies. There are, however, passages in the ‘definitions’ that complicate the picture 
of man we have drawn here. Thus, in Viii.4, the author affirms that there are in fact two 
intellects, one with which every man is endowed (in the Greek version called ‘divine’) and 
that ‘pertaining to the soul’ which, however, is not present in every human soul.
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Kenosis, Poiesis and Genesis 183
the Byzantines that their ‘synods of all colours convoked here and there’ drove 
them ever farther from the ‘orders and the definitions of the faith which had 
been established by the power of the holy Ghost’.45 Therefore, although the 
Armenians continued along the centuries to seek further definitions for their 
pre-Chalcedonian orthodoxy, they have never attached to the results of these 
attempts an absolutely binding character.
To return to our main subject, hermes’ awareness of the danger of interposition 
between the voice sounding in silence and the receptive ear can probably also 
explain the ‘incomplete’ and ‘moving’ character of the hermetic texts.46 since 
the word that breaks its bond with silence loses its meaning, every thought that 
pretends to the position of a rigid and accomplished system is distrusted. At each 
moment the word ought to spring anew, it can never get hardened, being otherwise 
unable to represent the image of the one who inspires it.
Could such a thought find room in Christian theology? This question merits 
a whole series of studies. One of the possible directions of such research would 
be the investigation of the impact of hermes’ ideas upon theological writing in 
Armenia and the consequent reception (and rejection) of post-Ephesian texts 
by the Armenian Church. But the hermetic writings may also be of interest to 
contemporary Western religious thought. in this respect, we cannot but limit 
ourselves to a brief final remark. dwelling on the fact that hermetic literature, in 
J.-P. Mahé’s words, ‘puts itself continuously into question’, we in fact approach 
– by a different route – what Gianni Vattimo has called il Pensiero debole, 
‘Weak Thought’, a thought which avoids metaphysical categories, peremptory 
affirmations and closed systems. Vattimo’s starting point is not, however, the 
encounter with silence, but rather God’s kenosis: if the Creator of heaven and 
earth ‘emptied himself taking the form of a slave’ (Phil 2:7), then every systematic 
thought and every ‘natural law’ ought to be put into question.47 he suggests that 
the thought which continuously overcomes itself derives from the very shape of 
Christianity: ‘Revelation does not reveal a “truth-object”; it speaks of a salvation 
45 igor dorfmann-Lazarev, Arméniens et Byzantins à l’époque de Photius: Deux 
débats théologiques après le Triomphe de l’orthodoxie (Leuven, 2004), pp. 50, 427–8.
46 Cf. the striking description given to hermetic literature by J.-P. Mahé: ‘C’est 
une littérature qui, par son essence même, refuse la perfection écrite et cherche 
systématiquement ce qu’il y a d’incomplet, de mouvant’ ; ‘la véritable prière … ne cherche 
pas à accumuler litanie sur litanie, et louange sur louange; elle tend, au contraire, à 
un approfondissement progressif ; elle ne cesse de se remettre en cause pour chercher, 
insatiablement, un contact plus vrai, plus direct avec Dieu. Aucun terme ne lui suffit, 
aucun dépassement ne la satisfait, elle finit toujours par constater son impuissance’, in 
Mahé, Hermès en Haute Egypte, vol. 2, pp. 437, 455.
47 Gianni Vattimo, Credere di credere (Milan, 1996), pp. 31, 35; Dopo la cristianità: 
per un cristianesimo non religioso (Milan, 2002), pp. 24–6, 63–73; These points of Vattimo’s 
conception of Christianity are discussed in igor dorfmann-Lazarev, ‘La découverte de la 
kénose de dieu par la “Pensée faible”: La religion dans l’œuvre de G. Vattimo’, Istina, 49/4 
(2004): 361–77.
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in process … Christ presents himself as the authentic interpreter of the prophets, 
but at the moment of parting from his disciples, he promises to send them the 
Spirit of truth which will continue to teach and will therefore pursue the history 
of salvation.’48
48 Vattimo, Credere di credere, p. 43; cf. also Dopo la cristianità, pp. 29–43, 90, 
131–3.
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